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The Attitude of Trust is Basic 
Paul Faulkner 
 
Most philosophical discussion of trust focuses on the three-place trust 
predicate: X trusting Y to φ. This paper argues that it is the one-place 
and two-place predicates Ð X is trusting, and X trusting Y Ð that are 
fundamental. 
 
 
Almost without exception, philosophical discussion of trust focuses on the 
three-place trust predicate: X trusts Y to φ (see, for instance, Baier 1986, 
Holton 1994, Jones 1996, Faulkner 2007, Hieronymi 2008 and Hawley 2014). 
And then understands the two-place trust predicate Ð X trusts Y Ð 
derivatively. So Hawley analyses X trusts Y to φ as X relies on Y to φ because X 
believes Y has a commitment to φ (2014: 10). And two-place trust is then 
Òreliance on someone to fulfil whatever commitments she may haveÓ (2014: 
16). There is no question that three-place trust is central to our engagement 
with others. We trust one another to act in various ways Ð to turn up on time, 
return our goods, give a fair quote and so on Ð but, it is the contention of this 
paper, that this form of trust, its contractual form one might say, is not 
fundamental. Rather, the fundamental forms of trust are purely attitudinal: 
they are X trusting, and trusting Y. Whilst our relying on others to do things 
can permit all sorts of explanations, the fundamental explanation of why X 
trusts Y to φ is simply that X trusts Y or merely that X is trusting. Two-place 
and one-place trust Ð our trusting and trusting others Ð are the basic forms of 
trust. 
That the two-place and one-place trust predicate should be taken as 
basic can, I think, be supported by five independent pieces of evidence. 
The first piece of evidence comes from everyday language. First, both 
the two-place predicate ÔX trusts YÕ and the three-place ÔX trusts Y to φÕ have 
unique and irreducible meanings. It is true that sometimes we use ÔX trusts YÕ 
as shorthand for ÔX trusts Y in some particular wayÕ; for instance, asked why 
she left her diary visible on the desk, X might reply that she trusts Y, and by 
this mean that she trusts Y not to read it. However, this is not the most 
straightforward use of ÔX trusts YÕ, which is that of a description of XÕs 
attitude towards Y as a trusting or trustful one, see Becker (1996: 44-5). And by 
implication that Y, the object of XÕs attitude of trust, is someone, as X takes it, 
who can be trusted. By contrast, ÔX trusts Y to φÕ is a metaphysically hybrid 
notion insofar as it describes an action Ð XÕs relying on Y to φ Ð and says of 
that, that it is done with, and because of, a certain attitude, which is best 
described as trusting. That is, if it reports the fact of XÕs reliance and XÕs 
attitude to relying, then it is not a direct description of XÕs attitude and so 
does not carry the implication that X thinks Y is someone to be trusted. Now 
while ÔX trusts YÕ might imply a disposition to rely on Y in various ways, and 
one to rely on Y to φ, it cannot be reduced to such a disposition and 
formalised as Ô∀φ, X trusts Y to φÕ. For ÔX trusts YÕ might be true, while Ô∀φ, X 
trusts Y to φÕ will almost certainly be false: there is always a limit to what we 
will trust others to do. Moreover, this does not seem to be merely a 
quantification issue, since there is no restricted range of φ, R, for which 
Ô∀φɊR, X trusts Y to φÕ stands as an adequate formalism of ÔX trusts YÕ. For 
while it might be true that a complete lack of willingness to rely on Y would 
falsify the claim that ÔX trusts YÕ, there is no particular way in which X must 
rely on Y for this claim to be true. However, while ÔX trusts YÕ and ÔX trusts Y 
to φÕ are unique statements, there is some implication from the former to the 
latter but not the other way round. If X does trust Y, then there must be some 
φ for which X trusts Y to φ. But that X trusts Y to φ does not, in any way, imply 
that X trusts Y more generally, even if this would often also be true. Thus, of 
the two predicates, the two-place one is arguably more fundamental. 
Similar things may then be said when comparing the one-place 
predicate ÔX trustsÕ Ð or maybe the grammatically better ÔX is trustingÕ Ð with 
the two-place predicate ÔX trusts YÕ. The former equally seems to have a place 
in everyday language: Òwe doÓ, Uslaner observes, Òspeak of Ôtrusting peopleÕ 
generallyÓ (2002: 22). And this form does not seem reducible to Ô∀Y, X trusts YÕ 
for similar reasons. It will not be that X trusts everyone, and there is no 
determinate range of people that XÕs trust must range over. Rather, ÔX is 
trustingÕ seems to make a different claim: that X has faith in people, in some 
Ògeneralised otherÓ, as Uslaner says, not faith in any specific person or 
description (2002: 24). But again, while ÔX is trustingÕ and ÔX trusts YÕ seem to 
be different and unique statements, there is some implication from the former 
to the latter but not the other way round. So of the two predicates, the one-
place predicate is arguably more fundamental. Thus, the heart of our notion of 
trust seems to be simply an attitude of trust, which may, but need not, take 
specific persons as its object, and which can support, but need not, the act of 
relying on persons. This is what is meant by the claim that the attitude of trust 
is basic. 
The second and third bits of evidence come from considering trust in 
conjunction with distrust. ÒTo understand trustÓ, Katherine Hawley says, Òwe 
must also understand distrust, yet distrust is usually treated as a mere 
afterthought, or mistakenly equated with an absence of trustÓ (2014: 1). The 
mere absence of trust might report nothing about oneÕs attitudes but rather 
stem from the fact that there is no cause for reliance. The car mechanic I trust 
when I donÕt seek a second quote, I donÕt trust to deliver my mail. However, 
my lack of trust here is its mere absence: I donÕt trust the mechanic in this 
regard not because I donÕt think him up to the job but because that is not his 
job. So I donÕt rely on him in this respect. Distrust, however, is not the mere 
absence of trust: it is an attitude in its own right, and one might expect as 
Hawley proposes, there to be analytic connections between the attitudes of 
trust and distrust; such as, for instance, that if distrust is an appropriate 
attitude to take, then trust is not (2014: 4). However, that there are such 
analytic connections is hard to maintain if the fundamental notion of trust is 
taken to be three-place or ÔX trusting Y to φÕ. Given that trust in this sense is 
metaphysically hybrid, any failure of trust can always be down to the failure 
of the action component. (My not trusting my mechanic to deliver my mail 
because I donÕt rely on him to do this.) But then trust could be inappropriate 
because of some inappropriateness in this action component; it would, for 
instance, be wrong to trust my mechanic to deliver my mail. However, this 
wrongness does not imply it is right to distrust my mechanic. So to keep the 
parallel between trust and distrust, the focus needs to be on the attitudinal 
conception of trust: trusting Y and distrusting Y. Moreover, this is implied by 
the fact that there is no three-place distrust predicate: even when distrust is 
appropriate, we do not say ÔX distrusts Y to φÕ. 
Third, trust and distrust, it is often said, are contraries but not 
contradictories (Jones 1996: 15). And this is true all the while trust is 
conceived contractually, or as three-place. In this case, a lack of trust need not 
imply distrust because there might be a lack of trust because there is a lack of 
reliance; there is no contract, as it were, or commitment as Hawley would say 
(2014: 10). I donÕt trust my mechanic to deliver my mail because I donÕt rely on 
him doing so, he have having undertaken no commitment to do so. So all the 
while trust is conceived contractually, a lack of trust does not imply distrust Ð 
trust and distrust are merely contraries. However, a lack of trust can imply 
distrust. Where trust is the background attitude Ð where it is two-place or one-
place Ð if trust is lost what remains is not merely its lack but distrust. Suppose 
X trusts Y. In saying that X trusts Y, were X to say this, what X describes is a 
basic attitude that one can take towards a person, which involves making 
positive presumptions about their goodwill towards oneself. Remove these 
positive presumptions, so that it can no longer be taken for granted that Y will 
act in certain ways and will not act in others and what is left is distrust. For 
example, you might not seek a second quote simply because you trust your 
mechanic, and if so, you just presume the quote is honest; you might leave 
your diary lying on the desk simply because you trust your parents, and if so, 
so you just presume they wonÕt read it; or suppose you trust your partner, if so 
you will just presume they are not cheating on you; and so on. Remove trust in 
these cases, so you no longer presume the quote honest, the diary safe or your 
partner faithful and these situations are now ones of distrust.  
Relatedly, we tend not to trust people not to do things. We can do so, I 
can trust you not to reveal my secrets for instance, but generally we do not so. 
For instance, you donÕt trust your partner not to have an affair, not because 
they canÕt be trusted in this but because such trust is peculiarly self-defeating. 
To trust them not to have an affair would be to draw their attention to the fact 
that you do not presume they will not, and so to draw their attention to the 
fact that you distrust them. Equally, your partner would not reassure you 
were they to say ÔdonÕt worry I wonÕt be unfaithfulÕ. This should be unspoken, 
part of what is presumed by mutual trust. The same goes for one-place trust, 
in having a non-directed attitude of trust we presume things about how 
people in general will behave towards us. For instance, we presume they wonÕt 
be Òunpromptedly aggressiveÓ, where this presumption, Williams observes, 
can be sustained by reasoning, Òin desperate circumstancesÓ, but in Òbetter 
timesÓ we just take it for granted. And it needs to be taken for granted because 
Ò[o]ne is not likely to be reassured by someone who says, ÔI promise not to 
murder youÕÓ (2002: 89). Thus to give a proper account of the relation of trust 
to distrust Ð one which recognises that these can be contradictory Ð requires a 
purely attitudinal conception of trust. But once trust is conceived 
attitudinally, it is then hard to see how it is not this attitude that is, as 
Williams says, the basic form of trust Òon which all social interaction 
dependsÓ (2002: 88). 
The fourth piece of evidence concerns the relationship between trust 
and trustworthiness. Its relation to the thought that the trusted is 
trustworthy, in part, identifies the attitude of trust. Reassurance comes from 
this thought. However, this connection between trust and trustworthiness is 
broken if trust is conceived contractually, or as three-place. Under this 
conception, say in a case where X trusts Y to φ, the thought that Y is 
trustworthy is, at least, that Y will reliably φ. However, it might be that this is 
not the trustworthy thing to do and, indeed, can be quite the opposite. This 
might be illustrated by a case where the trusting party is in error. Suppose, 
then, that X is set on a course of action from which no good will result, but for 
which he needs to borrow YÕs car. He asks Y for his car keys and Y, fairly 
judging the consequences of handing them over, refuses. In misjudging what 
to do, X will equally regard this refusal as Y being blind to his need, and so as a 
failure of trustworthiness. And if trustworthiness is identified by reference to 
trust Y would be so. But of course, YÕs response is the right and so trustworthy 
one. This point is made and developed by Knud Ejler L¿gstrup in his 
discussion of trust.  
The other personÕs interpretation of the implication of the trust 
offered [that is, the trusting party YÕs interpretation] É is one thing, 
and the demand which is implicit in that trust É which I must 
interpret is quite another thing (1997: 21). 
Responding to trust cannot be Òmerely a matter of fulfilling the other personÕs 
expectations and granting his or her wishesÓ (1997: 21). This is because in the 
trust situation Òwhat we are speaking of is a demand for love, not for 
indulgenceÓ (1997: 21). Thus the demand on the trusted Ð what L¿gstrup calls 
the radical ethical demand and might be called the demand that X be 
trustworthy Ð is generated by the fact of the trusting partyÕs dependence. It is 
not generated by XÕs attitudes Ð that is, by his trust. But this is to say that 
trustworthiness cannot be defined with respect to trust if trust is conceived 
contractually, or as three-place. The analytical connection between trust and 
trustworthiness is preserved if trust is taken to be merely an attitude. For 
suppose, in this error case, that X simply trusts Y. In trusting Y, X will think 
that Y is trustworthy. And in thinking this, X will not place any specific 
expectation on Y, but will rather just expect it of Y that Y does the right or 
appropriate Ð the trustworthy Ð thing. 
Connected to this point is Katherine HawleyÕs observation that trust 
can be unwanted. In this regard she gives the example of trusting her 
colleagues to buy her champagne, in a situation where, for whatever reason, 
she is to be honoured. Now it might be that her colleagues plan to buy her 
champagne but, Hawley observes, Ò[s]till, they do not invite or welcome my 
trust in this respect; instead, they want to give me a treat, not merely to act as 
trustworthiness requires, and certainly not to risk betraying me if they forget 
to buy the champagneÓ (2014: 7). This observation is good but her trust is 
unwanted, in part I suggest, because it implies the falsehood that the 
colleagues would be untrustworthy if they did not supply it. This is false 
precisely because trustworthiness should not be defined by reference what a 
trusting party trusts one to do. That is, it is not defined by reference to the 
three-place trust predicate. Rather, trustworthiness is a matter of doing the 
appropriate thing whatever that might be, where this might still be to buy 
champagne in HawleyÕs example. But to trust them to do this Ð the right thing 
Ð is just to trust in the two-place sense, and such trust would not be unwanted. 
What is objectionable is the implicit contract, not the background attitude. 
The fifth and final piece of evidence for the priority of the one and two-
place predicates over three-place one comes from a consideration of infant 
trust. Any account of trust, Annette Baier proposes, should accommodate 
infant trust. And this generates the constraint Òthat it not make essential to 
trusting the use of concepts or abilities which a child cannot be reasonably 
believed to possessÓ (1986: 244). Suppose now that X trusts Y to φ. In trusting Y 
to φ, X will take an optimistic view of Y and her motivations; and in so taking 
this view X will, at the very least, presume that Y will φ, or maybe believe that 
Y will φ, and X will make this presumption because X manifestly depends on Y 
φ-ing, or holds this belief because Y has committed to φ-ing. However, one 
understands trust in its contractual form, XÕs trusting Y to φ involves a 
complex of reasoning. It involves imagining the trust situation from YÕs 
perspective, imagining YÕs recognition of XÕs dependence; then maybe 
imagining Y seeing this as a reason to do what X depends on Y doing, or 
maybe recognising what Y has committed to do in this particular trust 
situation. Now it is arguable that this kind of second personal reasoning is 
both prosaic and fundamental to moral thought, see Darwall (2006). However, 
it is not the kind of reasoning that an infant could engage in. By contrast, 
suppose that X trusts or trusts Y; for instance, an infant X trusts his mother 
Y. In trusting his mother, X need not have any further thought; the trust is no 
more than a confidence or faith Ð a trust, as we say Ð in his mother. This does 
seem to be the kind of attitude that an infant could have. Suppose then that 
BaierÕs constraint on accounts of trust is plausible. This constraint can then 
be satisfied simply by taking the attitudinal form of trust Ð the one and two-
place predicates Ð to be basic.1 
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